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Wbatever its merit as an account of political 
institutions, the social contract theory bas, in recent 
years, been the subject of intense scrutiny as an 
explanation for our moral obligations. Prominent 
examples of this approacb include the work of Jobn 
Rawls and David Gauthier. l 
Acriticism of this understanding ofmoral obligation 
arises from several commentators, partly as a result of 
claims made by the original authors. The criticism is 
this: The social contract theory seems to imply that the 
scope of our moral obligations is unreasonably narrow. 
In particular, at fIrSt glance the theory seems to exclude 
from direct consideration the interests of animals and 
severely defective bumans. 
Criticisms of this sort are intuitive in nature and 
common to pbilosophy, yet many view them with 
disdain. It is an open question whether the failure of an 
otherwise attractive theoretical account to square with 
our moral intuitions tells against thetheory or the 
intuition, but resolving this dispute lies beyond the scope 
of this paper. However, surely the intuition and the 
theory cannot both be true, or at least this is bow it has 
seemed to the majority ofcommentators on the question. 
One either believes that we bave direct duties to animals 
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and defective bumans or that contractarianism is true, 
but one may not consistently believe both. 
I wish to sbow two things. First, one may not 
rationally resolve this problem one way for defective 
bumans and another way for animals. Regardless of 
one's substantive position on this dispute, wbatever 
reasons one offers regarding one group will apply 
equally, ceteriusparibus, to the other. Second, whatever 
methodological inclinations one bolds toward intuition­
ism, one may consistently accept a contractarian account 
of morality and believe that we bave direct duties to 
tbe parties in question. I will explain bow this 
compatiblist position is possible, indeed quite plausible. 
1. The Problem 
Tbe reason that contractarian accounts ofmorality 
appear inconsistent with possessing direct duties to 
beings at the margin of the moral community is fairly 
clear. Ifwe understand moral obligations to be the set 
of rules that rational, self-interested beings would 
accept under a bypothetical set of circumstances, then 
sucb rules will be construed by and for rational 
creatures. Ordinarily, we enter into contracts for the 
purpose of bringing benefit, directly or indirectly, only 
to the contractors. If some beings are excluded in 
principle from participating in an agreement, and if 
the contractors lack a fundamental interest in their 
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welfare, then it is unclear how the terms of an 
agreement could be understood as directly benefitting 
them (although they may reap unintended, collateral 
benefit). Rawls writes: 
Last of all, we should recall here the limits
 
of a theory of justice. Not only are many
 
aspects of morality left aside, but no account
 
is given of right conduct in regard to animals
 
and the rest of nature....While I have not
 
maintained that the capacity for a sense of
 
justice is necessary in order to be owed duties
 
of justice, it does seem that we are not
 
required to give strict justice anyway to
 
creatures lacking this capacity.2
 
Interpreting this passage is difficult insofar as 
Rawls goes on to say that it is nonetheless "wrong" to 
be cruel to animals because of "duties of compassion." 
Rawls seems to say that his is only a theory of justice 
and not a comprehensive theory of moral obligation 
and that we may have direct moral obligations to 
animals that go unexplained by his theory. However, 
insofar as the concept of nonmaleficence is contained 
within the concept of justice (it is incoherent to 
suppose that one could be both just and cruel),3 the 
theory would be awkward at best if it presumed to 
explain the latter and not the former.4 Nonetheless, 
Rawls clearly sees tension between contractarianism 
and one's presumed duty of nonmaleficence to non­
rational creatures. 
In a similar vein, David Gauthier writes: 
Only beings whose physical and mental
 
capacities are either roughly equal or mutually
 
complementary can expect to fmd cooperation
 
beneficial to all. Humans benefit from their
 
interaction with horses, but they do not
 
cooperate with horses and may not benefit
 
them ....We may condemn all coercive
 
relationships, but only within the context of
 
mutual benefit can our condemnation appeal
 
to a rationally grounded morality.s
 
Aside from the odd comment that we "may not"­
cannot, might not, ordinarily do not?-benefit horses 
(by giving a horse open pasture, sugar cubes, and 
protection, do we not benefit it?), Gauthier makes it 
clear that a "rationally grounded morality" cannot 
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explain why it is immoral to exploit animals strictly for 
our own purposes and possibly to their detriment. 
2. Three Possible Solutions 
The most obvious solution to this dilemma is simply 
to grasp one of its horns. I do not intend to offer any 
sustained defense or refutation of contractarian theories 
of moral obligation, nor would the scope of this paper 
allow it. Let us assume, therefore,for the sake of the 
argument, that some version ofcontractarianism is true, 
thereby eliminating one solution to the problem. 
This leaves, of course, the other option, where we 
deny that we have any direct moral obligations to 
animals and severely defective humans. Doing this, 
however, runs counter, at least in the latter instance, 
to some ofour most deeply held moral convictions. If 
we accept that we have no direct duties to the severely 
retarded. then, as Peter Singer points out, we are 
committed to "holding that mental defectives do not 
have a right to life and therefore might be killed for 
food ...or for the purpose of scientific experimen­
tation."6 This is indeed an unsavory position and as 
such ought to be avoided as long as rational 
alternatives exist. 
Intuitive appeals of this sort have lost favor among 
philosophers in recent years, but fortunately we need 
not rely solely on intuition to address the point. There 
are sound theoretical reasons for claiming that severely 
defective humans, at least, are appropriate objects of 
direct moral concern. The simple fact that they have 
awareness of their surroundings, some sense of 
continuity of self through time, and an ability to 
experience pleasure and pain are all reasons sufficient 
to explain their membership in the moral community. 
They are subjects of biographical lives, and because of 
this we have moral duties toward them. 
Another possible solution lies in rescuing our 
intuitions by separating animals from severely defective 
humans. If there is a significant moral difference 
between them, then we could accept contractarianism 
and avoid the counter-intuitive results imagined above. 
Ofcourse, this option requires at least two things. First, 
it must be explained how human yet nonrational 
creatures are included within the social contract. 
Second, it must be explained how the ftrst explanation 
applies to severely defective humans but not to at least 
some animals. In other words, what possible moral 
difference exists between them? 
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Neither of these tasks is easy. I shall postpone a 
discussion of the first approach, but it is fairly clear 
that even if we can account for direct moral obligations 
to defective humans under contractarianism, we cannot 
do so in such a way that excludes nonhuman animals. 
What possible morally relevant difference exists 
between them? In the case of fetuses or newborns, we 
might appeal to their potential rationality, but this 
response, although excluding animals, does not address 
the severely retarded whose potentialities are quite 
limited. The only other candidates are an appeal to 
religious doctrine or species membership. Although the 
former allows for a real moral distinction, it is doubtfully 
true?The latter is certainly true, but allows for no moral 
distinction. Several authors have attempted to explain 
why species membership simpliciter is morally 
significant, but none of the attempts succeed.8 They all 
employ one of two tactics. Either one sees species 
membership as morally significant because it represents 
a family relationship that persons share with the less 
fortunate members of the species, or some species are 
deemed morally significant because their members 
typically share certain morally important properties. On 
either understanding, we owe other humans more moral . 
consideration than we do members of other species 
regardless ofany other propenies each may possess. 
Understanding moral obligation in terms of family 
relationships pOses a difficulty for any attempt to specify 
just which family groupings are significant. The 
defenders of this approach have species in mind, but 
one could repeat the same reasoning and insist that we 
ought to treat members of our own race better than 
members of other races due to the family resemblance 
of skin color. This type of argument could be repeated 
for a potentially infmite number ofclassifications. Note 
that a defender may not argue that some classifications 
have moral relevance and others do not because, 
according to this approach, we assign moral worth only 
after we have decided upon a classification. 
The second approach recognizes that the possession 
of various morally relevant properties (sentience, 
rationality, etc.) is what explains moral worth, but in an 
oblique way. This perspective recognizes the moral 
value ofbeings who belong to any classification whose 
members typically possess the necessary properties. 
This theory of moral worth avoids the problem 
encountered by the first attempt, but it runs afoul of an 
entirely different problem. Michael Tooley illustrates 
the difficulty: 
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Let John and Mary be two individuals that are 
not rational beings, and that belong to different 
species, but which are indistinguishable with 
respect to their psychological capacities and 
their mental lives. It is possible that John 
belongs to a species 99% of which are rational 
beings, while Mary belongs to a species of 
which only 1% are rational beings. If species 
membership is morally relevant. .. , it will be 
wrong to kill John, but may very well not be 
wrong to kill Mary.... 9 
Tooley's far-fetched thought experiment reveals a 
purely theoretical objection to the theory of moral 
obligation in question. Any attempt to define the moral 
community according, not to the capacities that 
individual prospective members possess, but, rather, 
according to the groups to which they belong, is 
unsatisfactory. Ifwe start down the road of including 
beings within our scope of moral concern simply 
because they are members of some group or another, 
we may just as easily exclude others because of their 
group membership. This strategy is, of course, typical 
ofracism, sexism and all of the other 'isms' which seek 
to assign individuals less moral value than others based 
on their membership in some group. 
One might object, noting that species membership 
is merely a sufficient, rather than a necessary, condition 
for inclusion within the moral community; hence, we 
do not risk this type of exclusion. However, this 
response misses the point. The issue concerns how mere 
species membership serves any normative role in our 
moral reasoning, and adopting one explanation over 
another fails to account for how species membership is 
relevant in the frrst place. 
There is, of course, at least one sense in which an 
appeal to group membership is appropriate in this 
context. There is nothing at all objectionable in 
recognizing that we have moral duties to all and only 
those beings who are members of the group defined as 
"those possessing morally relevant properties." But this . 
understanding, although unobjectionable, completely 
begs the question. Group membership may always be 
appealed to in the trivial sense that those possessing 
morally relevant properties can be recognized as 
constituting a group. The difficulty lies in determining 
which properties are morally relevant, and I know of 
no remotely plausible explanation for the moral 
relevance of species membership.tO 
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The upshot is that if we wish to maintain that 
defective humans have moral value and deserve our 
protection, then we are rationally bound to take the same 
position relative to those nonhuman animals whose 
cognitive capacities are at a similar or greater level of 
development. All that remains is a strictly empirical 
matter of determining which animals possess the 
necessary capacities, a task better suited to cognitive 
psychology than moral philosophy. 
3. A Promising Approach 
One model suggests a possible solution. It is 
common for one party to enter into a contract with 
another for the purpose of serving, not one's own 
welfare, but the welfare of a third party, such as when 
parents establish a contract with a day care center for 
the purpose of serving a child's interest. This type of 
situation is quite common and suggests a promising 
approach to the current problem. Perhaps we ought to 
think of animals and severely defective humans as 
appropriate objects of direct moral duty much as we 
think of children in this way. Young children lack the 
capacity to make agreements, and yet rational beings 
regularly assume contractual obligations toward them 
at the request of other rational beings with an 
understandable interest in their own children's welfare. 
In the example above, the day care operator enters 
into the contract solely for the purpose of serving her 
own interests. The parents' reasons are perhaps, although 
easy to understand, somewhat difficult to explain. 
Two explanations seem plausible. Either the 
parents identify their own interests with that of the 
child's so intimately that their motive is, in an indirect 
fashion, also based in self-interest, or natural parental 
affection motivates a spirit of altruism. According to 
the former explanation, parents are self-interested. The 
latter explanation suggests that they are self­
sacrificing. Whichever explanation we accept, the 
parental model fails to explain how, according to 
contractarianism, we have direct moral obligations to 
nonrational beings. 
Let's consider each account in turn. According to 
the self-interest model, we must imagine that rational 
beings would identify with mental defectives and 
animals. Why would this be true? Of course, in those 
cases in which an ordinary adult human has a special 
relationship with either-as in the case of a pet or a 
severely retarded child-the self-interest model might 
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apply. However, contractarian morality tries to provide 
a general explanation of moral obligation that does not 
depend on the presence of any specific prior affections. 
Contractarian morality asks us to assume that, while 
signing the hypothetical contract, one has no particular 
friends or family to consider. We have only rational self­
interest, and from this perspective it is radically unclear 
why one would closely identify one's own interest with 
the interests of nonrational creatures and thus have any 
moral obligations toward them. 
On the other hand, the altruistic account offers a 
ready explanation for including the nonrational within 
the scope of moral concern. We care for animals and 
defective humans simply out of a spirit of compassion. 
This account provides the needed explanation to be sure, 
but it is one clearly inconsistent with contractarianism. 
Contractarian morality is intentionally heartless. It 
attempts to explain moral obligation within a purely 
self-interested, nonaltruistic framework. 
The parental model thus fails. Either it fails to 
provide the required moral explanation, or it does so at 
the expense of the very theory it purports to exemplify. 
It seems, therefore, that if we wish to account for moral 
obligations owed to the nonrational by the rational 
within a contractarian framework, we must find an 
explanation elsewhere. 
4. A Solution 
Having ruled out a rejection of contractarianism, an 
attempt to deny all direct moral duties to animals and 
defective humans, an attempt to affirm moral duties to 
defective humans while denying the same to nonhuman 
animals, and a parentalmodel ofcontractarianmorality, 
the only remaining alternative lies in a compatiblist 
position explaining how contractarianism might account 
for an inclusion of both within the moral community. 
As stated at the outset, most commentators on the 
subject have rejected this approach, preferring instead 
to emphasize incompatibility. To appreciate the strength 
of this position, we should review the reasons that 
motivate it. Contractarianism seems to exclude non­
rational creatures from the moral community because, 
according to the theory, the moral community is defined 
in terms of those who participate in the contract. This 
is understandable. According to the political model, 
individuals come together out of self-interest and live 
under the terms of a contract. Society includes only 
those who explicitly or implicitly agree to the terms of 
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the contract. Similarly, on the moral model, individuals 
agree to live under a set of moral rules comprising the 
entirety of the rights and obligations to which persons 
are subject. Themoral community is comprised ofonly 
those who, in a hypothetical circumstance to be 
specified, agree to its terms. Since only rational beings 
can make agreements, only rational beings are subject 
to and protected by the rules that result. 
If a contractarian account of moral obligation 
includes animals and defective humans, then it must 
not follow too closely in the above respect its political 
analogue. There are, in any case, good reasons not to 
understand a moral theory strictly in terms ofa political 
model. A political, social contract necessarily includes 
rather specific facts concerning human nature and the 
natural surroundings. The simple fact that the globe 
includes scores ofindependentpolitical systems testifies 
to the importance ofethnic, geographical, andhistorical 
facts in binding us together in a bewildering number of 
ways. According to the moral model, though, such 
contingencies are presumably less important. Indeed. 
Rawls' account in particular asks us to imagine a 
hypothetical original position in which such facts are 
not known. The moral rules that result exist on a much 
higher level of abstraction than corresponding political 
rules of the traditional social contract. 
Appreciating this relatively high level ofabstraction 
helps explain how the interests of nonrational beings 
can be included within a Rawlsian-type contract. Those 
in the original position are rational and self-interested, 
but there is no guarantee that their status remains so 
after emergence from behind the veil of ignorance. The 
capacities necessary for rational choice possessed by 
those behind the veil of ignorance need not endure for 
all after incarnation. We require only that the beings to 
whom we owe justice are such that they may benefit 
from the rational, self-interested choices made in the 
original position. If the veil of ignorance is employed 
to ensure that choices concerning a future account of 
justice do not discriminate against particular social, 
racial, or economic groups who stand to benefit from 
just treatment, then it may also obscure the possibility 
of incarnation as a mental defective or animal. The one 
restriction on the scope of this incarnation would be 
that only those who may benefit from just treatment 
are considered (it would be senseless to speak of treating 
arock or a bug unjustly).ll 
Quite apart from Rawls' specific proposal, we can 
approach the issue from the general perspective of the 
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nature of contracts and their results. The social contract 
theory argues against including non-rational creatures 
within the scope of the moral community since the 
benefits of the contract are designed to accrue to only 
those who agree to it. This is because the contract is 
motivated out of self-interest, and all of the rules that 
result prescribe behavior which serves the collective 
long-term interest of the contractors. 
The moral rules that result from a hypothetical 
contract, while motivated out of self-interest, must 
include elements such as justice and fairness whose 
application does not in all cases maximize self-interest 
for all the contractors. In other words, applying such 
principles may require that persons occasionally forgo 
their own interests in recognition of the interests of 
others. Indeed, Gauthier sees that the great challenge 
of formulating a rationally grounded morality lies in 
defending the seemingly paradoxical claim that pursuit 
of a long-term strategy of self-interest often requires 
that one strikes a bargain that is less advantageous than 
some alternative. Contractarian morality has excluded 
nonrational creatures from the moral community 
because it limits the benefits of the contract to only those 
who are at least capable of participating in its formu­
lation. This assumption is captured by the passage from 
Gauthier cited earlier in which he notes the impossibility 
of rational cooperation between horses and humans. 
So, if contractarian morality allows, even demands 
each contractor to forgo maximum benefit to one's self, 
all that remains is the question of whose interests the 
theory allows us to consider. As a question about who 
may benefit from a contract,rather than who can 
participate in one, the traditional argument that non­
rational creatures are not, indeed, cannot, be covered 
by the contract seems odd. 
For instance, spectator sports often seem at least 
partially designed to benefit non-players-those not 
even capable ofplaying!-as well as players. So, too, 
it is not unreasonable that the moral rules resulting from 
the social contract may be designed to benefit those 
who lack moral agency and who cannot, following the 
analogy, play the game. 
The goal of any theoretical account of moral 
obligation is to determine not merely the moral status 
of this or that action but of whole classes of actions; 
for this reason, a satisfactory moral theory must be stated 
at a relatively high level of abstraction. For contrac­
tarianism this has meant a focus not on any existing 
contract but, rather, on a hypothetical contract that 
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rational persons would agree to under an imaginary set 
of circumstances. After all, human beings almost 
certainly never explicitly agreed to any contract 
outlining the set of all of our moral rights and duties. 
This requirement, demanding that we look to 
hypothetical, not actual, contracts, provides a theoretical 
explanation for how the welfare of the nonrational can 
be provided for under a contractarian framework. All 
we need ask is what would a nonrational being bargain 
for ifit were temporarily able? The fact that the ability 
to bargain rules out any actual nonrational creature is 
beside the point, since the nonrational creature imagined 
is rational only while making the agreement. This is 
not as farfetched as it may seem, since the temporarily 
rational regularly make agreements similar to this-as, 
for example, when one leaves instructions in a living 
will directing how one wants to be treated if through 
disease or accident one becomes nonrational.12 
Similar to this, we can imagine a (obviously 
hypothetical) temporarily rational horse bargaining for 
the sorts of advantages that would benefit ordinary 
horses. Since ordinary horses have relatively limited 
capacities to appreciate any supposed advantage, the 
moral rules that result would be necessarily one-sided. 
Humans would have real duties to horses, but their 
duties to other humans would be considerably more 
stringent and comprehensive. 
There is yet another explanation for how the scope 
of a contract can be supposed to include those other 
than the initial contractors. It is not surprising that 
rational, self-interested beings often enter into contracts 
intending to benefit others as well as themselves. The 
reasons for this are psychological and varied, but 
perhaps the most obvious is that persons typically prefer 
engaging in activities that allow for a sense of a shared 
experience. We do not need to assume parental altruism 
to recognize that we often engage in social behavior 
precisely because, all else being equal (like the man 
who refuses to drink alone or the artists and athletes 
who prefer to exercise their gifts for the benefit of an 
appreciative audience), we prefer sharing our well-being 
with others. Ifwe make this psychological assumption, 
we see that rational agents may opt for the sort of 
contract which provides the greatest benefit to all 
those capable of benefiting from it. Extending the 
benefits of one's good fortune to others, so long as one 
does not as a consequence seriously undercut one's own 
reward, is, at a minimum, quite consistent with rational 
decision-making. 
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We require further study to determine with any 
precision how to balance, according to contractarian 
morality, our own interests against the welfare of 
the nonrational. In the case of animals, it may tum 
out that depriving ourselves of the taste of their flesh 
is a relatively minor sacrifice in contrast to the 
benefits ceded to them. On the other hand, and more 
likely, even on the contractarian account, we are 
obliged to treat animals much better than we already 
do. With respect to seriously defective humans, my 
sense is that our treatment of them is already quite 
decent. The above analysis does not recommend a 
difference in treatment of them; instead, it offers an 
alternative theoretical explanation that replaces mere 
species-preference. 
So long as we recognize that animals and seriously 
defective humans are similar to us in the morally 
relevant sense that they, like us, have an interest in 
avoiding pain and engaging in pleasurable activities in 
a stimulating environment, we can, according to the 
analysis above, explain moral duties toward them. 
By way ofa conclusion, in the first instance contracts 
may issue from Rawlsian hypothetical circumstances 
which include the possibility that the contractors will 
be incarnated as nonrational beings. Ifso, then the rules 
that are agreed on ought to speak to the interests of 
those who are capable of benefiting from decent 
treatment as well as those who are capable of initiating 
it. Second, any plausible contractarian account of 
morality conceives of the contract as hypothetical, not 
actual, and there is no obvious reason why the 
hypothetical circumstance conceived may not be framed 
in terms that a creature would demand for itself if it 
were temporarily capable of rational activity. Third, 
human beings typically prefer agreements that allow 
for a wider, rather than a narrower, range of benefit out 
of a natural desire to share the benefits of one's own 
good fortune so long as this sharing does not entail a 
serious diminution of one's own welfare. 
If this analysis is correct, then we ought no longer 
test the plausibility ofa contractarian theory ofmorality 
against implications it has for seriously defective 
humans. Also, the price we pay for aligning contrac­
tarian theory with intuitions concerning our duties to 
defective humans forces us to accept similar duties 
toward some animals. This latter conclusion, although 
not strongly supported by intuition, is an inevitable 
consequence of other intuitions that most of us are 
reluctant to abandon. 
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